How did Villarreal’s dominance secure them a round-of-16 place?

Match Analysis 

After the away win in the first leg of the UEFA Europa League’s first round of the knockout phase, Villarreal welcomed Sporting Lisbon at the “El Madrigal” for the return game. Javi Calleja’s squad got back on the right track after a turbulent few months of bad performances, and the 1-0 win in Portugal was a breath of fresh air for the team. Marcel Keizer’s boys came to Spain hoping they could get the better of their opponents, but the situation on the pitch was hugely different than what Verde e Blancos planned beforehand.

This tactical analysis of the match indicates that Villareal dominated the game fully and that they are finally getting in the form they expected to be in from the start of the season.

Lineups

Both teams started in a 3-4-3 formation with the wingers in the inner corridors, and the wing-backs as the attacking options next to the sidelines.

Villareal went into the game without Santi Cazorla, so the midfield was held by Javi Fuego and Manu Trigueros, while Pablo Fornals and Dani Raba worked in the half-spaces and helped them in defence. The key player for Sporting was Bruno Fernandes who had the attacking support in Diaby and Bas Dost. Calleja’s idea was to double-team Fernandes with two fast players surrounding him, with Mario Gaspar as a right-centre-back and Llambrich as a right-wing-back.

Villarreal pressing drove Sporting crazy

The home team focused on high positioning and pressing the opponent. Javi Calleja’s boys had quite a compact setting when they were not in possession. They tried to go high-up the pitch and press the Portuguese in their own half, trying to force them to pass the ball to the flanks. The pass to the wing-backs was the pressing trigger for the home team. They always positioned themselves in order to let the pass get to Jefferson and Ristovski, so they could press them from several sides.

When the initial press didn’t work, the non-pressing part of the team came closer to the others and maintained the pressure on their opponents. The other trap for the Sporting players was intended for their defensive midfielders. If they got the pass from the wing-backs, they were usually surrounded by three players in yellow shirts.

Out of those types of situations, Villareal got the better of their opponents which resulted in lots of counter-attacks in which they had numerical superiority in the final third. Despite that, they didn’t manage to score from those situations because of poor decision-making and because of the good reactions of the Sporting Lisbon defenders.

Positional play for the home team came down to playing out wide. Fornals and Raba searched for the gaps between Sporting’s midfield and defensive line, positioning themselves in the half-spaces. It was a common occurrence that when the ball was on the left-hand side, Fornals positioned himself in the left-inner corridor and Raba played as a second striker on the right-hand corner of the box.

Fornals in the inner corridor freed the space for Pedraza to overlap and to be one of the main attacking options for Calleja’s team.

In defence, the Yellow Submarine sat in a 5-2-3 shape. If the pressing didn’t go as they planned, Villarreal retreated to a central or even a low block, letting the away team pass around their well-organised team.

Sporting’s game didn’t go as they planned

The Lions from Lisbon came to Ceramica one goal down to their opponents so they needed to go into the match with an offensive attitude. They tried to start their attacks from behind, searching for the midfielders in order to progress faster through the lines, but they were caught in a trap so that didn’t work for them. Because of that, they often surrendered the ball to Villarreal’s defensive line and then went high to press them.

Their pressing was not as good as Villarreal’s was, they had issues in compactness of the lines. Since Gudelj was watching Fornals and Raba the whole time, they were usually a few seconds late to press high. That created the gap between the pressing part of the team and the deep-lying midfielders, so the Yellow submarine had an easier way to break through the press.

If Sporting’s pressing was good and Gaspar, Funes Mori, and Ruiz were left with no passing options, they would try to skip the midfield in their build-up and search for Moreno to get out of the press.

Sporting scored their goal out of good positional defending and a huge mistake from Funes Mori. Bruno Fernandes took the ball away from him and had an empty field on the opposition’s half. H scored without any difficulties and got his team an unexpected lead.

Red card changed the situation

Jefferson’s red card at the start of the second half changed the tactical approaches of both coaches. Sporting went to a low block in front of their own goal, trying to protect the lead and to secure extra-time. Villarreal made a few changes in their squad, bringing Ekambi and Iborra in for Raba and Javi Fuego.

That meant Fornals kept searching for the gaps between the lines but with the help of Iborra. Ekambi and Moreno were the striking duo. At that moment, Llambrich was basically a winger.

After the last substitution for the home team, when Santi Cazorla entered the pitch for Llambrich, the Yellow submarine became more dangerous in front of Salin’s goal. In that phase of the match, four midfielders in Villarreal’s squad were constantly in motion, rotating their positions and trying to confuse the opponent.

The numerical superiority that Calleja’s team possessed resulted in an unguarded player on the flanks, which was usually Fornals or one of the two strikers.

The equaliser came out of the surplus of players that Villarreal had and out of the tiredness of the away squad. Cazorla positioned himself perfectly in the half-space on the edge of the box and passed the ball to Ekambi who was not guarded because of the lack of players Sporting had. The Senegalese striker then passed the ball to Fornals who was alone in the middle of the box, so there was no doubt about the finish.

Afterwards, the game became a total mess with Sporting trying to score and get themselves through to the next stage. But, Fornals’ goal ensured the round-of-16 for Villarreal since Sporting Lisbon didn’t have enough stamina to come back from the shock.

Conclusion

Villarreal are finally in the right form. After the win against Sevilla, the good result versus Sporting Lisbon, and more importantly the fact they played really well indicates that their struggles have come to an end. They outplayed their opponent with brilliant pressing traps which Calleja set up, especially in the first half. And the rotations up-front. Keizer’s squad weren’t prepared enough to cope with that kind of play, and their task was much more difficult after Jefferson was sent off.

The Lions were not at the top of their game – they were overpowered by their opponents, so the Yellow submarine deserved to go through to the next stage of the Europa League.

Autor: Marko Jović

PSG RUN OVER SOLSKJAER’S UNITED WITH THEIR GAMEPLAN

Match Analysis

To the excitement of the football fans around the globe, the winter break has come to and end and the Champions League is back. First day of the knockout phase brought us a huge clash between the dashing Manchester United and Paris Saint Germain, the best team in France. After sacking Jose Mourinho, the Red Devils appointed Ole Gunnar Solskjaer who managed to regenerate the team’s chemistry which resulted in eleven straight matches without a loss.

The draw for the knockout stage paired the two “Goliaths” of modern football, after PSG finished first in group C ahead of Liverpool, Napoli and Red Star Belgrade, while Manchester squad ended the group stage in second place with only Juventus ahead of them.

Both teams struggled through the first phase of the Champions League – the Frenchmen due to a tough competition, and Mourinho’s boys because of their own poor form at the time.

The French champions that came to Old Trafford were not at their best, not in the sense of results, but rather not fully fit given the number of injured players. In their first knockout game they needed to fight for the win without the help of their pernicious attacking duo – Edinson Cavani and Neymar Junior.

As United’s atmosphere was glowing in the past few weeks, and PSG didn’t have a complete squad to compete with, the home team entered the match with a triumphant attitude. However, the match went in a completely opposite direction as Tuchel found a way to outplay them.

LINEUPS

Manchester United went into the match with an expected lineup on their side. The Norwegian picked Bailly over Jones, probably in order to adapt his defensive line to a light-legged striker PSG had in Mbappe. Lingard, Martial and Rashford in the front three gave him a speedy transition from defence to attack. Also, they posed as weapons in the pressing game high up the pitch.

PSG started with one of the only possible sides they could take out on the pitch because of all the injuries, which disrupted their original mindset. Tuchel’s idea was to double-team Martial on his right side, using Dani Alves as a winger and Thilo Kehrer as a right back. Even though the graphics say his team played in the 4-2-3-1 formation, that was their shape only when they were not in possession. When they were attacking, the squad transformed into a 3-4-2-1 with Alves and Bernat as wing-backs, who often went higher up the pitch and played as some sort of wingers so the team was then in a 3-2-2-3 shape.

After the hapless period he spent at Old Trafford, Angel Di Maria was back at the “crime scene” for the first time after his salvation by the oil-potentates. He and Julian Draxler occupied the gaps between United’s defensive and midfield lines as the inverted wingers in Tuchel’s formation. Presnel Kimpembe was the one paired in central defence with Thiago Silva, and the midfield was held by the recovered Verrati and the newly-created midfielder Marquinhos.

PSG’s EASINESS UNDER PRESSURE

Solskjaer’s team tried to high-press the opponent at the start of the game, believing that PSG isn’t as ready for high-tempo play as their squad is because a lot of players in their starting 11 weren’t completely fit. But, the Frenchmen were ready for the game their opponents prepared for them, so they easily coped with the way United set up.

From the start, the Red Devils’ problem was that they were not compact enough. This was caused by their desire not to let the speedy Mbappe a lot of free space in their own half, which prevented them from positioning their defensive line high up the pitch. That resulted in a huge gap between the pressing part of the squad – the front three players and Pogba and Herrera – and the defending side which included Matić and the back four.

PSG used that to break through the pressing with ease and to get comfortable 5v5 situations after they threw the front five players out of the game. An example can be seen in the picture below.

The room between Matić and the pressing players was big enough for Tuchel’s side to overflow it comfortably. Verrati’s ball protection was on an astonishing level, so the team progressed easily through Manchester United’s lines.

Even when Matić joined the pressing, PSG pulled him out of his position and provided space for the run-ins behind his back, since the defensive line wasn’t going to come closer because of their plan to keep Mbappe from getting free space to run into.

Marquinhos and Verrati used that as their advantage perfectly as they led their side to a lot of good opportunities in front of the opposing goal.

United’s initial idea didn’t work due to a cautious lining of their back four, so PSG got an advantage on which they didn’t count on in the first place.

TUCHEL’s MASTERCLASS SHUTS DOWN UNITED’s MIDFIELD

The German came into the game with a clear idea of how he wanted his team to play. Their main idea was to pester the opponents’ midfield trio and not allow them to deliver the ball into the final third easily. They were always on the midfielders’ back when they got ball, using the pass from Young/Shaw to the inside player as a pressing trigger.

Herrera, Matić and Pogba were forced to pass backwards, or forced to lose the ball in dangerous situations.

PSG was always near the “creative side” of United’s squad, so their time and space for maneuver were restricted. Marquinhos provided great support for his team, keeping the events on the pitch under control.

The key to success in this game for the French champions was isolating Pogba out of the game. He had a player in his immediate vicinity all the time, so the most creative player on the pitch was neutralized for Solskjaer’s side. Marquinhos was shadowing him from the moment he entered Old Trafford. Man-marking started from midfield, and continued all over the pitch.

Marquinhos marked Pogba closely wherever he moved, disrupting him even in the most simple motions. 

Excluding Pogba from the game left PSG only with the problem of Herrera, who protected the ball very well in the first half, and managed to supply the ball to his attackers a few times. Jesse Lingard also played a key role, emptying the space for Rashford to run into, and confusing Kimpembe and Bernat in terms of how they would defend the rotations that took place in the half-spaces.

The injuries of Lingard and Martial made the game harder for Solskjaer, since he lost two players who could attack the free space, and had to put in Mata and Alexis, two players that play only when they have the ball in their possession. That eased the defending for the French squad, who could turn their minds to attack and overpower the home team.

THE GERMAN TACTICIAN’s PLAN DOMINATED THE PITCH

As we know, Tuchel is a mastermind, especially when it comes to attacking. His schemes and rotations were the ones he got known for ever since he was the head-coach of Borussia Dortmund.

Since Solskjaer let the away team have possession, the German coach used the tactical set up of the opponent as a weapon against them.

Even though PSG were defending in the 4-4-2 formation, the attacking structure of their team was more fluid and more of a 3-4-2-1. Draxler and Di Maria had a task to occupy the half-space pockets between United’s lines, which were a little bit spacious due to the caution of the defensive line caused by Mbappe’s speed.

Mbappe was less used in positional play. The main corridor through which Tuchel’s team played was the one Di Maria and Draxler were in. They tried to position themselves behind midfielders’ back, searching for their blind side and using it as their advantage. Since Bailly and Lindelof were careful about PSG’s number 7, they stood further off the Argentinian and the German, so the two of them had a lot more space to get comfortable in front of De Gea’s goal.

Pogba’s role in defense was as questionable as his offensive performance. He managed to forget his role in several situations and to miss out on marking the opponents’ attacking midfielders in his zone. The Frenchman was often a few steps behind the player he was in charge of – usually Di Maria and Draxler, but sometimes even Marquinhos – so they mostly had the advantage of an extra second to think what they were going to do, or to just run into empty space.

Di Maria and Draxler used a lot of motions to trick the opposition and confuse them, so they would open the pockets in their defense where the PSG players would run into.

In the second part of the game, PSG tried to exploit Ashley Young’s weaknesses in positioning which he had as a right back, so most of their attacks were on his side of the pitch. They occupied him with either Mbappe or Di Maria, who are both more agile than the Englishman, so they could easily have an extra man on their left side of attack. That resulted in plenty of chances, and with one ball behind De Gea’s back. 

In the second half, Tuchel used inverted player positions in some situations. In the one leading to the second goal, Bernat was practically a midfielder, and Di Maria was in the outer channel as a wide winger occupying Ashley Young, United’s weakest defender.

Bernat confused Solskjaer’s midfield in terms of how to defend him, and sent a ball to Di Maria who easily coped with the pressure Young put on him. After a few dribbles, the Argentinian managed to find the space for the pass into the Red Devils’ box. 

Mbappe tracked the action brilliantly and got away from his opponents to calmly beat De Gea.

Tuchel’s plan worked amazingly well and the absence of two of his best attackers wasn’t noticeable at all because of great performances from Di Maria and Draxler. Verrati and Marquinhos owned the pitch throughout the whole game, making the decisions for United’s midfield very difficult. Their gameplan in this match brought them in pole position for the next knockout round with the 2:0 away win.

CONCLUSION

This was the game in which Tuchel defeated Ole Gunnar in the tactical battle. The German coach got his team to play the way they prepared beforehand and overpowered United’s caretaker manager. Tuchel’s ideas easily beat Solskjaer and showed the world that Ole still has a lot to learn in order to compete with the world’s best tacticians.

PSG succeeded in their intention to shut down the links between the midfield and attacking line of Manchester’s side, making the distribution of the ball harder for the most creative players of their team. Pogba’s red card in the finishing minutes of the match rounded-up his bad performance for the evening. Without him, the English team will have an even smaller chance to overturn the result in the second leg.

Autor: Marko Jović

Klop i Buvač - da li je „rokenrol fudbal“ otišao iz Liverpula?

Rastanak Jirgena Klopa i Željka Buvača doneo je neki novi Liverpul. Da li je do izmene u stručnom štabu, da li do pojačanja koja su u klub došla prethodnog leta, činjenica je da su postali konkurentni, takmičarska ekipa koja ne preza od igre na rezultat. 

„Crveni“ su postali takmac za titulu, navijači širom sveta ubeđeni su da je ovo sezona kada će njihov klub, po prvi put u svojoj bogatoj istoriji, osvojiti Premijer ligu. Deluje da je višegodišnji projekat zacrtao svoj zenit za ovu sezonu, te je ekipa koja je trenutno prvoplasirana na tabeli najjačeg engleskog šampionata u nju ušla sa novim imenima i promenom fudbalske filozofije.Bio posredi sukob među dvojicom stručnjaka, ili ne, raskol je kroz vizuru rezultata za harizmatičnog Nemca bio neminovnost, ali i odlazak na neku drugu ideološku destinaciju.

Sedamnaestogodišnji zajednički rad Klopa i Buvača uticao je na promenu percepcije običnog ljubitelja fudbala. Svojim idejama sproveli su evoluciju po pitanju prelaska iz napada u odbranu, i obrnuto, pa je svet zahvaljujući njima dobio fudbal koji rezultira mnogo bržim tempom, većim brojem poseda i tranzicijom kao ključnim napadačkim oružjem.U godinama koje su zajedno proveli u Dortmundu vodeći Borusiju, doveli su transformaciju ekipe iz odbrane u napad do savršenstva, postavljajući kontra-presing kao ideal napadačke igre modernog loptanja. Na krilima „Gegenpresinga“, jurišanja na protivnika odmah po izgubljenoj lopti, Nemac i Srbin su izgradili sebi ime i kult jednoj tehničko-taktičkoj filozofiji u sportu.

Projekat na Mersisajdu imao je svoje prednosti i mane, očekivanja navijača neretko deluju kao suzavac za ideje, a pritisak uprave na takvom mestu jeste metak u noge čoveku koji planira da bude šampion u maratonu.Propagandisti totalnog fudbala koji su pristigli iz Nemačke uspeli su da balansiraju obe otežavajuće okolnosti. Prilagodili su svoje namere zahtevima ostrvskih vlastelina i bučnih mas-medijskih potrošača i odlučili da svoju revoluciju obave strpljivo, bez srljanja ka krajnjem cilju.  

S početka, šablon igre bio je ekvivalent njihovom poslednjem poslu u Borusiji, samo sa nekoliko stepenika nekvalitetnijim igračkim kadrom - ne od Borusije, već od zatečene premijerligaške konkurencije. Iskoristili su dovođenje Roberta Firmina, koje se desilo leta koje je prethodilo njihovom dolasku u klub, da oko njega organizuju svoje zamisli i iskoriste sve sposobnosti kojima Brazilac raspolaže.

Firmino je bio - i ostao - pandan kontra-presinga, najznačajnija karika Liverpulove ideje na koju je bilo potrebno dodati još sličnih kako bi poprimili sjaj kojem teže. Nakon nekoliko prolazaka kroz limbo „oni su sjajni treneri-oni to ne mogu“, dvojac je uspeo da napravi jasnu sliku o fudbalu koji će biti primamljiv oku, ali opet i mezimac pobede.

Dolazak u klub poletnih krila Manea i Salaha značio je korak napred, osiguravanje statusa na klupi i približavanje višegodišnjeg rada njegovom klimaksu. Na taj način je zamisao Buvača i Klopa napokon mogla da bude pretvorena u opipljivu srebrninu, dovevši ih u situaciju da postanu glavne face u selu, ne zato što su najglasniji, već jer znaju šta pričaju.

Trenerski duo je sa sobom doneo mentalitet pobednika. Postali su redovan učesnik Lige šampiona i relevantan takmičar najjače lige na Ostrvu pa je rratni veteran sa Mersisajda prestao da pokazuje na svoje plakete i ordenje iz prošlosti i okrenuo se sadašnjem trenutku. „Gegenpresing“ je nakratko postao njihova realnost. Liverpul je igrao kroz posed, ali je važnije utakmice rešavao pritiskanjem protivnika na njihovoj polovini odmah po izgubljenoj lopti. Postali su ekipa koja najviše trči u čitavom prvenstvu, prelazivši pritom iz odbrane u napad u najkraćem periodu od svih konkurentskih ekipa.

Prošlosezonski fudbal neodoljivo je ličio na Klopove i Buvačeve godine provedene u Dortmundu, uz prilagođavanje igre Mohamedu Salahu koji je imao sezonu karijere. Crveni su suzili prostor za igru, izvlačili protivnike „visoko“ i bliže svom golu, okrenuvši se igranju na polovini sopstvene polovine i na taj način ostavljali Egipćanina u „izolaciji“ na drugoj strani terena. Ta praksa im je prošle godine donosila mnogo koristi, Salah je postao najbolji igrač lige iskoristivši livade prostora koje su, gomilanjem igrača na jednom delu igrališta, ostajale samo za njega. Kada „Plan A“ nije uspevao da prođe, Liverpul se okretao kontra-presingu, visoko postavljenoj defanzivnoj liniji i Bobiju Firminu koji je ključ pritiska.

„Redsi“ su u tom maniru odradili veći deo utakmica, oslanjavši se na provereni trojac u napadu i ne previše kreativan vezni red sa Hendersonom, Milnerom i Vajnaldumom. Osnova kreacije ponovo je bio Firmino, koji je razbijao protivničke linije tražeći prostor između njih i davajući pasove za krilne igrače koji su tražili prostor između bekova i štopera. Nekada je potrebno razmišljati pragmatičnije, oslanjati se na više od jednog oružja, pogotovo ako vam je pištolj naslonjen na slepoočnicu, a puška negde između lopatica. Buvač i Klop su ušli u nesuglasice pred finale Lige šampiona protiv Real Madrida. Finale sa rivalo koji preti sa svih strana i za kojeg ne možeš ubiti samo jednim metkom.

Neki engleski mediji tvrde da je predmet rasprave bila ideja kako igrati protiv Španaca. Nije potpuno sigurno kakve su bile dve suprotstavljene taktike, ali ako je suditi po onome što se moglo videti na samoj utakmici, Nemac se zalagao za konzervativniju metodu kojom je probao da neutrališe opasnu sredinu „Los Blankosa“.I pre meča usledio je razlaz stručnjaka, Klop je ostao „sam“ na čelu Crvenih, a Buvač pod ugovorom sa klubom, ali daleko od „Enfilda“. 

Nemac je postupio nemački, shvatio da fudbal nije samo zabava, ali na osnovu harizmatičnog nastupa i dalje čuva ugled trenera koji se zalaže za totalni fudbal. Ali, da li je to zapravo tako? Da li je odstupanje od principa konstantne igre u poslednjoj trećini terena - koje je bilo uočljivo još u finalu prošlogodišnje Lige šampiona - razlog rastanka dva trenera?

Ova sezona pokazala je da su filozofije dojučerašnjih saradnika skoro pa oprečne. Iako i dalje nastupaju pod parolom „posed i presing“, Klopovi izabranici izmenili su navike i načine svog delovanja. Liverpul je nastavio da se zalaže za visoko pozicioniranu poslednju liniju i oštar presing po izgubljenom posedu, ali deluje da je protok lopte sporiji i očekivaniji, kao i da je tranzicija manje opasna po protivnika jer u završnicu dolazi manje igrača.

Njihova igra ove sezone je konzervativnija, oslonjena na dva oprezna vezna igrača ispred poslednje linije i smeštenog u centar napada. „Dupli pivot“ na poziciji zadnjih veznih deluje kao dodatna garancija sigurnosti odbrane pre nego spona u napretku igre.

Napredak u napadačkom smislu nije postignut, iako je Liverpul bolje plasiran na tabelama negoli prethodne sezone, zatvoreniji su i zavisniji od Firminove magije. Igra leži na ponavljanju Robertsona na levoj strani igrališta, Fabinju koji praktično sam drži sredinu terena i pronalazi igrače u poluprostorima, dok ostali vezni nastoje da obezbede prolongiranje poseda i razvodnjavanje igre. Izolacija Salaha je postala predvidiva opcija, Egipćanin ove godine češće koristi greške protivnika u pozicionoj igri nego ideje sopstvene ekipe.

Klopova ekipa je nekonkretnija nego prethodne sezone, nespremija da povuče poteze koji prazne prostor za napadačka utrčavanja, jer se samim tim remeti defanzivno pozicioniranje.

Kada protivnici zatvore kanale do međuprostora u kojem leluja Brazilac, šef struke ima u rukavu samo jedan „Plan B“ - Šaćirija u veznom redu, koji je, istini za volju, najbolji „Plan B“ Premijeršipu. Na osnovu prikazanog u ovogodišnjim utakmicama, stiče se utisak da je Buvač zaslužan za rotacije u napadu i brojnije tranzicije prilikom transformacija iz defanzive u ofanzivu.

Nemojte pogrešno da shvatite, Nemac je vrhunski trener koji je unapredio klub. Liverpul je svakako respektivniji u takmičarskom pogledu, postao je ekipa koja ume da pobedi minimalnim rezultatom uz slabiju igru i to je jasan pokazatelj očvršćavanja karaktera ekipe.

Slika o šefu struke Crvenih zasada je iskrivljena, posmatrana kroz prethodne učinke i sezone, a ne kroz ono što on pokušava da postane. Oni polako odustaju od fudbala koji godi samo očima, a prilagođavaju se onom koji donosi istoriju. Njegova ideja će u jednom trenutku prevagnuti u neku drugu ideologiju, drugačiju od onoga za šta se zalagao njegov nekadašnji pomoćnik.

Da li je „rokenrol fudbal“ napustio Enfild zajedno sa Banjalučaninom?

Teško je reći, lepršavost u modernom fudbalu je luksuz više nego obaveza, garant trofeja pre će biti čvrsta organizacija i čelična disciplina. Nasuprot tome leže naši ideali, koncepti fudbala gde je sve podređeno golovima.Gledajući očima ljudi u Liverpulu, učinjen je pravi potez, potreba da uzmete trofej je u njihovom slučaju makijavelistička, gubitnici nisu važni na putu blještavila. 

Srpski trener će sa sobom nositi etiketu jednog od novijih revolucionara igre, Džimija Hendriksa nekog sveta koji je više voleo predvidljiviju muziku. „Gegenpresing“ će nastaviti da živi u svom prilagođenom obliku, najviše zbog šarma Jirgena Klopa, ali jasno je da tranzicioni fudbal na posed više nije osnovno sredstvo za dolaženje do cilja igrača sa Enfilda.

Željku Buvaču će u jednom trenutku dosaditi ispijanje kafa, a tada ćemo videti čija je zapravo ideja bio moderni totalni fudbal. Dok se neka pametna uprava ne seti da ga angažuje, zaslužio je predah.

Autor: Marko Jović